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The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is one of the most popular games of the Game Theory due to
the emergence of cooperation among competitive rational players. In this paper, we present the
PD played in cells of one-dimension cellular automata, where the number of possible neighbors that
each cell interacts, z, can vary. This makes possible to retrieve results obtained previously in regular
lattices. Exhaustive exploration of the parameters space is presented. We show that the final state
of the system is governed mainly by the number of neighbors z and there is a drastic difference if it
is even or odd.
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non-equilibrium phase transition
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the emergence of cooperation between compet-
itive rational players [1, 2, 3, 4], the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) [5, 6] is one of the most popular games of the Game
Theory [7]. When it is played repeatedly, one has the It-
erated Prisoner’s Dilemma [8, 9]. If the PD is played
in a group of players with spatial structure, this ver-
sion is known as Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma (SPD) [10].
These spatial structures may generate chaotically chang-
ing spatio-temporal patterns. Cooperators and defectors
coexist, and cooperator proportion oscillates indefinitely.
This occurs when each player interacts with the nearest
neighbors, for instance, in a square lattice. Moreover,
adding the interaction with the next nearest neighbors
(corresponding to the chess king possible moves) the spa-
tial patterns are smoother. During the game, cooperators
and defectors organize themselves in clusters. The most
interesting dynamics occurs on the borders of these clus-
ters, causing the oscillating behavior of the proportion of
cooperators.
The final proportion of cooperators and defectors in
the chaotic phase depends on the initial configuration and
the magnitude of the parameter T (temptation). More-
over, the connectivity among players also plays an im-
portant role in the dynamics of the clusters [11]. Studies
about PD had been carried out in different topologies
such as square lattice [10], graphs [12] and also in com-
plex networks as random graphs [11], scale-free networks
[13], small-word networks [14]. We have used the simplest
lattice topology, i.e. one-dimensional lattice to represent
regular lattices at any dimensionality [15]. The compu-
tational implementation of PD in the one-dimensional
case is simpler than in other topologies, and it requires
less computational time to run the numerical codes. In
one-dimensional cellular automata, it is simpler to un-
derstand the way that oscillations in the cooperator pro-
portion take place [15]. Beyond the topologies, it is also
possible to consider the mobility of players [16].
In this paper we present an exhaustive exploration of
the parameter space for the IPD in the one-dimensional
cellular automata with a variable number of interacting
neighbors. After introducing the model in Section II,
we show the results in Section III. Final remarks are
presented in the Section IV.
II. THE MODEL
Consider a cellular automaton in a one-dimensional
lattice, with L cells, where each cell represents one player,
who has two possible states: θ = 1 (θ = 0) for coopera-
tor (defector). The automaton has no empty cells, so the
cooperator proportions, ρc(t), and defectors, ρd(t), leads
to ρc(t) + ρd(t) = 1. The initial proportion of coopera-
tors, ρc(0) = ρ0, 0 ≤ ρ0 ≤ 1, is an important parameter.
The state of Lρ0 players, which are chosen randomly by
a uniform distribution, are set as cooperators and the re-
maining ones are set as defectors. The neighborhood of
the i-th player is defined by z = (1, 2, . . . , L). If z is even,
there are α = z/2 adjacent interacting players to the right
and to the left hand side of this player. If z is odd, each
2side has α = (z−1)/2 players and player i interacts with
his/her own state (self-interaction) [15, 19, 20]. In addi-
tion to ρ0 and z the other free parameter in this model
is the temptation T in the conflict range 1 ≤ T ≤ 2.
Consider two players i and j playing the PD. The pay-
off of player i due to interaction with player j is given
by gθi,θj = θiθj + T (1− θiθj)θj , where θj is the state of
player j, with j = (1, 2, . . . , L). The total payoff, Pi, of
player i is: Pi =
∑
Vi
gθi,θj , , where Vi is the neighbor-
hood of the i-th agent. Since the payoff of each player
depends on z, the macroscopic regime, ρc, also depends
on it. Player i will compare Pi to Pk, where Pk is the pay-
off of k = (1, 2, . . . , z) set of players. If Pi < Pk, player
i copies the state of the player with the highest payoff,
otherwise player i does not change his/her current state.
The dynamics of the model is totally deterministic. This
strategy of copying the state of the neighbor that had
the highest payoff is the Darwinian Evolutionary Strat-
egy. Others evolutionary strategies can be adopted, like
the Pavlovian one [21]. The states of the players are
updated synchronously and they play until the system
reaches a stationary or dynamical equilibrium regime.
The cooperator proportion, ρc(t, T, ρ0, z), depends on
time, temptation, initial proportion of cooperators, and
the number of interacting players. The dependence of ρc
as a function of ρ0 and z is commonly neglected, possi-
bly due to the fixed lattice restriction in a d-dimensional
space.
The asymptotic cooperator proportion, ρ∞(T, ρ0, z),
is obtained when the system reaches the steady state,
which represents the final phase for the set of param-
eters (T, ρ0, z). The dependence of ρ∞ on z can be
understood due to the number of interacting coopera-
tors, c, with 0 ≤ c ≤ z, in the neighborhood of each
player. When player i interacts with ci cooperators out
of z neighbors, his/her payoff is [11, 19]: P
(ci)
i (θi) =
[T − (T − 1)θi]ci. Some useful relations follow imme-
diately: for a cooperator P
(ci)
i (1) = c, while for a de-
fector P
(ci)
i (0) = cT . For T > 1, P
(ci)
i (0) > P
(ci)
i (1)
and P
(c)
i (θ) ≥ P
(c−1)
i (θ). Transitions in ρ∞(T ) occur
when temptation crosses threshold values. In the con-
flict range, 1 < T < 2, these transitions are controlled by
[11]: Tc(n,m) = (z − n)/(z − n −m), where 0 ≤ n < z
and 1 ≤ m ≤ int[(z − n− 1)/2)] are integers.
III. RESULTS
We have used a one-dimensional cellular automaton
with L = 1, 000 cells, with Lρ0 cells set as cooperators
and the remaining ones as defectors. The asymptotic
cooperator proportion, ρ∞, is obtained from the mean
values of an ensemble of 1,000 configurations for the same
initial parameters. The parameter T increases in steps
∆T = 0.01 in the range 1 < T < 2 and ρ0 increases in
steps ∆ρ0 = 0.1 and the intermediate values are linearly
interpolated.
It could seem meaningless to consider T = 1.00, as the
cooperators and defectors have the same payoff, when one
plays against the other. However, the total payoff of each
player depends on the neighborhood, then, if the player
belongs to a cooperative cluster he/she has a higher pay-
off than the player from a defective one. In the coop-
erative/defective clusters border, the differences among
payoffs are essential to determine the system dynamics
[15].
Results for ρ0 = 0 and ρ0 = 1 are the trivial cases due
to the Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy. In a population
of cooperators (defectors) it is not possible to emerge a
defector (cooperator), because the players only can copy
the states of their neighbors. Mutations are not allowed
in our model, i.e. the noise of the system is null [22].
Our results are equivalent to those obtained in the
square lattices, which are briefly reviewed in the follow-
ing. Consider four scenarios. First, defectors can dom-
inate the system and determine the complete extinction
of cooperators, leading the system to a defective phase
(ρ∞ = 0). Second, defectors can increase and domain the
system, but cooperators are not extinguished, resulting
in a defective phase as well (0 < ρ∞ < 0.5). Third, co-
operators may domain the system forming a cooperative
phase (0.5 < ρ∞ < 1.0). And finally, cooperators can
extinguish the defectors determining a cooperative phase
(ρ∞ = 1.0).
Figures 1a and 1b show the surface of ρ∞ plotted as a
function of T and ρ0, for z = 8 (without self-interaction)
and z = 9 (with self-interaction), respectively. Differ-
ences between the presence/absence of self-interaction
are clear. The region of low values of T and high values of
ρ0 is a cooperative phase. The region of high values of T
and low values of ρ0 is a defective phase. The other two
regions, low T and low ρ0 or high T and high ρ0, the value
of ρ∞ is different and depends strongly whether z is even
or odd. The valleys for ρ0 ∼ 0.9 are due to the system
dynamics. For higher values of ρ0, the defective clusters
formed are tiny in comparison to the cooperative ones.
These defectors exploit theirs cooperator neighbors, but
they neither do not invade the cooperative cluster nor
are extinguished by the cooperative neighborhood dur-
ing time evolution.
Another visualization of ρ∞ for z = 8 is given in Fig-
ures 2a and 2b, and for z = 9 in Figures 2c and 2d.
It is equivalent to observe the phase diagram plotted as
surface in Figures 1a and 1b from the top view. The im-
ages 2b and 2d are the standard deviation of ρ∞ due to
statistics to avoid the initial configuration dependence.
Figures 2b and 2d, show very high values of standard
deviation. In these regions, small changes in the initial
configuration drastically modify ρ∞ from a cooperative
phase, ρ∞ > 0.5, to a defective phase, ρ∞ < 0.5. Thus,
in this region, it is not possible to define the system as
cooperative or defective, and this region is considered as
the coexistence of cooperative/defective phases. In other
words, the chaotic phase. The inclusion of self-interaction
implies in larger cooperation area in the phase diagram
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FIG. 1: Phase diagram, ρ∞ (asymptotic proportion of co-
operators) as function of T (temptation), ρ0 (initial propor-
tion of cooperators) and z (number of interacting players of
each player) plotted as a surface. (a) z = 8 (without self-
interaction); (b) z = 9 (with self-interaction).
as shown in Figures 2a and 2c. This means that co-
operation prevails when self-interaction is included. In
Figure 2a, ρ∞ drops abruptly for T > 1.7, this rapid de-
cay does not occur in Figure 2c, because self-interaction
shifts Tc to higher values. In Figure 2d, the higher values
of standard deviation fulfill a larger area, especially for
T > 1.7, for the same reasons. When Tc is shifted, a re-
gion that should be cooperative, when the self-interaction
is present, becomes defective in the absence of the self-
interaction.
The slice ρ∞ρ0 of Figure 1 shows ρ∞ as a func-
tion of ρ0. The curves are plotted for T =
(2.0, 1.8, 1.6, 1.4, 1.2, 1.0), in Figures 3a for z = 8, and
Figure 3b for z = 9. The value of ρ∞ increases in pres-
ence of self-interaction in the region 0 < ρ0 < 0.4, for
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FIG. 2: (a) Top view of Figure 1a, ρ∞ as function of T
and ρ0 for z = 8 (without self-interaction); (b) standard de-
viation of ρ∞ as function of T and ρ0 for z = 8 (without
self-interaction); (c) Top view of Figure 1b, ρ∞ as function
of T and ρ0 for z = 9 (with self-interaction); (d) standard
deviation of ρ∞ as function of T and ρ0 for z = 9 (with self-
interaction).
T z = 8 z = 9
1.0 0.3 0.1
1.2 0.5 0.2
1.4 0.6 0.5
1.6 0.7 0.6
1.8 1.0 0.7
2.0 1.0 1.0
TABLE I: Values of ρ0, when occurs ρ∞ > 0.5 for the first
time, for different values of T , for a system with z = 8 (with-
out self-interaction) and z = 9 (with self-interaction).
1.0 < T < 1.4. Self-interaction also shifts the emergence
of cooperation to lower values of ρ0, when compared to
a system without self-interaction. In Table I, one sees
the values of ρ0, where ρ∞ > 0.5 occurs for the first time
for different values of T . Notice the strong difference
concerning the parity of z.
The ρ∞ non-monotonous behavior for intermediate
values of ρ0 presented in Figures 1 and 3, in the region
1.3 < T < 1.5 and 0 < ρ0 < 0.5 are due to the coexis-
tence phases. In this region, the standard deviation of
ρ∞ is higher than in the remaining regions.
To observe the behavior of ρ∞, when z increases, see
the surfaces of ρ∞ for z = 20, in Figures 4a, and z = 19,
Figure 4b. Comparing Figures 1a and 1b, one observes
that if z is increased, the surfaces become more similar.
Figures 5a and 5c are the top view of the ρ∞ surfaces
for z = 20 and z = 19, respectively. They show the
convergence of ρ∞ for even and odd z. Figures 5b and
5d are the ρ∞ standard deviation for z = 20 and z = 19,
respectively. A relevant difference between even and odd
z is that the cooperative phase persists for T < 1.1 in the
range of 0.1 < ρ0 < 0.5 in the presence of self-interaction
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FIG. 3: Slice of the plane ρ∞(T, ρ0, z)ρ0 of the surfaces.
Asymptotic proportion of cooperators (ρ∞) as function of ini-
tial proportion of cooperators (ρ0) for (a) z = 8 (without self-
interaction) and (b) z = 9 (with self-interaction). Asterisks:
2.0; Stars: T = 1.8; Diamonds: T = 1.6; Squares: T = 1.4;
Triangles: T = 1.2; Circles: T = 1.0.
(see Figure 5c). If self-interaction is present the shift in
Tc to higher values remains in higher values of z.
A slice of the plane Tρ0 of the ρ∞ surface in Fig-
ures 1a and 1b at ρ∞ = 0.5, may represent a phase
diagram. In Figures 6a and 6c, the contours sepa-
rate the cooperative/defective phases, i.e. the phase-
diagram. Figures 6b and 6d are the contours that take
into account the standard deviation. Since there is the
phase coexistence, these contours separate the coopera-
tive/coexistence/defective phases.
In Figures 7a and 7b, there are the contours of the co-
operative/defective phase for different z values. When z
increases the contours converge to the same pattern in-
dependently if z is even or odd as shown in Figure 6c and
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FIG. 4: Phase diagram, ρ∞ (asymptotic proportion of co-
operators) as function of T (temptation), ρ0 (initial propor-
tion of cooperators) and z (number of interacting players of
each player) plotted as a surface. (a) z = 20 (without self-
interaction); (b) z = 19 (with self-interaction).
6d. For small z values, the z parity generates remarkable
differences in the contours, if z increases, the contours
converge and present a similar form and the phase coex-
istence region is narrower than for small z values.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Prisoner’s Dilemma in the one-dimensional cellu-
lar automata yields results according to the results ob-
tained previously for regular lattices in d dimensions.
The exhaustive exploration of the parameter space al-
lows us to observe that the parameter z plays the main
role in the dynamics. For low z values, the influence of
self-interaction is remarkable. Some studies about the
PD with variable coordination number, i.e. the neigh-
borhood size z, have been carried out. However, these
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FIG. 5: (a) Top view of Figure 4a, ρ∞ as function of T
and ρ0 for z = 20 (without self-interaction); (b) standard
deviation of ρ∞ as function of T and ρ0 for z = 20 (without
self-interaction); (c) Top view of Figure 4b, ρ∞ as function
of T and ρ0 for z = 19 (with self-interaction); (d) standard
deviation of ρ∞ as function of T and ρ0 for z = 19 (with
self-interaction).
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FIG. 6: Phase diagram of ρ∞ in the parameter space. (a)
z = 8 and z = 9, contours of the cooperative/defective
phase; (b) z = 8 and z = 9, contours of the coopera-
tive/coexistence/defective phase; (c) z = 20 and z = 19,
contours of the cooperative/defective phase; (d) z = 20 and
z = 19, contours of the cooperative/coexistence/defective
phase. The coexistence phase the phase is the space between
the first and the second contours of the same z.
studies adopt lattice topologies that are different from
the one-dimensional lattice used here, e.g. square lattice
[25], complex networks as random graphs [11], scale-free
networks [25, 26], small-world networks [14]. Another
difference in comparison to these studies is that the state
update of the players is asynchronous [25, 26], but in
our case is synchronous. Despite these differences, the
main features due to the z variation remain, such as the
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FIG. 7: Phase diagram of ρ∞ in the parameter space. (a)
contours of the cooperative/defective phase for even z =
(4, 6, 8, 12, 16, 20) (without self-interaction); (b) contours of
the cooperative/defective phase for odd z = (5, 7, 9, 13, 17, 19)
(with self-interaction). Notice the difference due to the parity
of z is not so important for z ≫ 1
dependence on the asymptotic cooperator proportion on
the neighborhood size. Our results are similar to those
obtained by Dura´n and Mulet [11] considering the neigh-
boorhood with self-interaction (odd z). Comparing our
results to those found in the literature, it is possible to see
that the way the connection among the players is settled
plays another important role in this problem indepen-
dently of the space dimensionality or network structure.
For intermediate values of T and ρ0 the chaotic phase
occurs. In the chaotic phase the outcome ρ∞ can belong
to the cooperative or defective phase due to only a small
change in the initial distribution of the cooperators.
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